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Abstract
Top monotonicity is a relaxation of various well-known domain restrictions
such as single-peaked and single-crossing for which negative impossibility results
are circumvented and for which the median-voter theorem still holds. We exam-
ine the problem of testing top monotonicity and present a characterization of
top monotonicity with respect to non-betweenness constraints. We then extend
the definition of top monotonicity to partial orders and show that testing top
monotonicity of partial orders is NP-complete.
Keywords: Social choice theory, domain restrictions, top monotonicity, single
peaked, single crossing, computational complexity.
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1. Introduction
The standard social choice setting is one in which a set of agents N express
preferences over a set of alternatives A and the goal is the select an alter-
native based on the preferences. Social choice theory is replete with results
concerning the impossibility of the voting rules simultaneously satisfying de-
sirable axioms. Prominent among these results are Condorcet’s Paradox [18],
Arrow’s Theorem [1], and the Gibbard Sattherwaite Theorem [19]. One ap-
proach to circumvent such results is identifying restricted domains in which
impossibility results disappear. Examples of domain restrictions include pref-
erence profiles that are single-peaked; single-plateaued [25] single crossing [26];
or order restricted [17]. For example, the Condorcet paradox does not occur
when preferences are single-peaked. The median voter theorem states that for
single-peaked preference profiles, Condorcet winner(s) exist and they coincide
with the median(s) of the voters’ most preferred alternatives [6].
Restricting domains to test robustness of impossibility results, and to iden-
tify settings that admit attractive preference aggregation rules, has been a fruit-
ful area of research within social choice [3]. Whereas economists have exam-
ined axiomatic implications of domain restrictions [see e.g., 28, 22, 21, 27, 25],
computer scientists are starting to examine natural problems such as checking
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whether a preference profile satisfies a certain structural property. On the com-
putational side, Bartholdi, III and Trick [5] and Escoffier et al. [16] showed that
checking whether a profile is single-peaked is polynomial-time solvable. Elkind
et al. [14] and Bredereck et al. [13] then proved that it can be checked in polyno-
mial time whether a profile is single-crossing. There is related work on checking
whether other computational problems such as manipulation become easy when
the preference profile satisfies some structure [see e.g., 11]. There has also been
some work on identifying ‘almost’ nicely structured profiles [see e.g., 12, 15].
Whereas the domain restrictions listed above have garnered a lot of atten-
tion, axiomatic results for these restrictions have been somewhat piecemeal. Re-
cently, Barbera` and Moreno [4] proposed a new consistency condition called top
monotonicity that is a relaxation of all the domain restrictions listed above but
which still is a sufficient condition for an extension of the median voter theorem
to hold. Top monotonicity also allows for indifferences both among the maxi-
mally preferred alternatives and non-maximally preferred alternatives.Barbera`
and Moreno [4] write that “Among other things, top monotonicity will stretch
the extent to which one may accommodate indifferences and still obtain positive
results regarding Condorcet winners in the case of the majority rule, or of voting
equilibria, more generally.” Top monotonicity is also induced in two natural of
tax rate determination [Appendix A, 4].
Although the axiomatic aspects of top monotonicity have been studied [3, 4],
it is not clear how easy it is to test top monotonicity of a preference profile.
Barbera` and Moreno [4] ask that “Is the satisfaction of our conditions easy to
check? Top monotonicity may be easy to check for in some cases, and also easy
to discard, in others.” In view of the generality of top monotonicity, similar
computational investigations of restricted domains [5, 16, 23, 2, 24], and the
questions raised by Barbera` and Moreno [4], we study the problem of testing
top monotonicity.
• We first present a reduction of testing top monotonicity to a previously
studied problem of checking the consistency of non-betweenness con-
straints [20]. Since checking consistency of non-betweenness constraints is
NP-complete, this reduction does not give us a polynomial-time algorithm
for testing top monotonicity but it does help frame the problem in a way
so it can be handled by solvers that deal with ordering constraints.
• We then extend the definition of top monotonicity to partial orders in a
natural way and show that testing top monotonicity of partial orders is
NP-complete.
• Finally, we highlight that a simple profile with dichotomous preferences
may fail to satisfy top monotonicity.
2. Top Monotonicity
Consider the social choice setting in which there is a set of agents N =
{1, . . . , n}, a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} and a preference profile %=
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(%1, . . . ,%n) such that each %i is a complete and transitive relation over A.
We write a %i b to denote that agent i values alternative a at least as much
as alternative b and use ≻i for the strict part of %i, i.e., a ≻i b iff a %i b but
not b %i a. Finally, ∼i denotes i’s indifference relation, i.e., a ∼i b iff both a %i b
and b %i a.
We define by ti(S) the set of maximal elements %i on S. Let A(%) be the
family of sets containing A itself, and also all triples of distinct alternatives
where each alternative is top on A for some agent k ∈ N according to %. We
are now in a position to present the definition of top monotonicity.
Definition 1 (Top monotonic). A preference profile % is top monotonic iff
there exists a linear order > over A such that
(i) ti(A) is a finite union of closed intervals for all i ∈ N , and
(ii) For all S ∈ A(%), for all i, j ∈ N , all x ∈ ti(S), all y ∈ tj(S), and any
z ∈ S, the following holds:
[x > y > z or z > y > x] =⇒
[y %i z if z ∈ ti(S) ∪ tj(S) and y ≻i z if z /∈ ti(S) ∪ tj(S)]. (1)
We will say that % satisfies top monotonicity with respect to order >.
Remark 1. Top monotonicity does not preclude cycles in majority comparisons,
but only guarantees that these do not occur at the top of the majority relation.
Remark 2. Top monotonicity on a set of alternatives is not necessarily inher-
ited on its subsets.
We examine the problem of testing top monotonicity. It follows from Def-
inition 1, that top monotonicity of a profile with respect to a particular order
can be checked easily.
Observation 1. For a given order over the alternatives, it can be checked
in O(|A|3 · |N |3) whether the preference profile satisfies top monotonicity with
respect to that order.
The observation implies that an order can be a certificate that a profile
satisfies top monotonicity. Hence, the problem of testing top monotonicity is in
complexity class NP. In view of the observation above, one can straightforwardly
design an algorithm to test top monotonicity: go through each of the |A|! orders
and checks whether top monotonicity is satisfied with respect to one of the
orders.
Observation 2. It can be checked in time O(|A|3 · |N |3 · |A|!) whether the
preference profile satisfies top monotonicity.
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A natural question is whether it is possible to test top monotonicity without
having to go through all the |A|! orders. First, we make another observation.
Lemma 1. If a preference profile satisfies top monotonicity with respect to an
order, it also does so with respect to the reverse of the order.
Proof. Note that for any S ∈ A(%), and for each i, j ∈ N , each x ∈ ti(S),
y ∈ tj(S), and z ∈ S, the conditions of (i) and (ii) in the definition of top
monotonicity are not affected if > is reversed.
3. Top monotonicity and non-betweenness violation constraints
In the rest of the section, we will heavily use the idea of NB (non-
betweenness) violation constraints on the prospective order on A. We now
introduce these constraints.
Definition 2 (Non-betweenness violation constraint). For x, y, z ∈ A, we call
a (y, {x, z}) a NB (non-betweenness) violation constraint for an order > over
A if neither x > y > z nor z > y > x can hold.
Next, we show that the existence of an order on A satisfying an
NB constraint set C can be checked efficiently.
Lemma 2. For an NB constraint set C on alternative set A, checking whether
constraints in C can be satisfied by some linear order is NP-complete.
Proof. Guttman and Maucher [20] proved that this particular problem is NP-
complete.
Lemma 3. For an NB constraint set C on alternative set A, there exists a
partial order that satisfies the constraints in C if and only if there exists a
linear order that satisfies the constraints in C
Proof. (⇒) If a partial order satisfies the constraints in C, then the arcs in the
graph representing the partial order already capture all the non-betweenness
constraints. Any additional arcs do not negate these constraints. Hence, any
linear extension of the partial order also satisfies the constraints in C.
(⇐) This direction is trivial since a linear order is also a partial order.
3.1. Characterizing top monotonicity
We characterize top monotonicity when the set of alternatives is finite.
Remark 3. The first condition of top monotociity is trivially satisfied when A
is finite.
In the next lemma, we show how NB constraints can be used to capture top
monotonicity.
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Lemma 4. For an order >, case (ii) in definition of top monotonicity is always
satisfied iff for all S ∈ A(%), for all i, j ∈ N , all x ∈ ti(S), all y ∈ tj(S), and
any z ∈ S such that ¬[y %i z if z ∈ ti(S)∪tj(S) and y ≻i z if z /∈ ti(S)∪tj(S)],
the NB constraint (y, {x, z}) holds.
Proof. For each S ∈ A(%), and for each i, j ∈ N , each x ∈ ti(S), y ∈ tj(S),
and z ∈ S, we check which of the following relative orders do not lead to a lack
of top monotonicity. The following relative orders over x, y, z trivially satisfy
the top monotonicity condition (ii) for set S and voter i because they do not
feature in the antecedent of implication (1).
(i) y > x > z
(ii) y > z > x
(iii) x > z > y
(iv) z > y > x
The following relative orders in which y is in between x and z are only in
contention if the consequent of implication (1) holds.
(i) x > y > z
(ii) z > y > x
If the consequent holds, then any of the six relative orders are possible and
there is no constraint for this 3-set of alternatives. If the consequent does not
hold, then we can safely say that both x and z are on one side of y i.e., y is
cannot be between x and z. Thus in this case we have a constraint on the
ordering over A that y cannot between x and z. Therefore for each 3-set of
alternatives, either there is no constraint or there is a constraint (y, {x, z}):
that y cannot be between x and z. Note that (y, {x, z}) is a required constraint
if even for one i, j and S, the consequent of implication (1) does not hold.
Next, we show that an algorithm to check whether a linear order satisfies
NB constraints can be used to test top monotonicity. Unfortunately checking
whether a linear order satisfies NB constraints is NP-hard in general.
Theorem 1. Testing top monotonicity polynomial-time reduces to checking
whether there exists a linear order that satisfies NB constraints.
Proof. In the algorithm, we first construct a set C of NB constraints that an
order must satisfy. We put in C, NB constraints pertaining to case (ii) of the
definition of top monotonicity as follows. For each S ∈ A(%), and for each
i, j ∈ N , each x ∈ ti(S), y ∈ tj(S), and z ∈ S, we check whether the consequent
of the implication (1) holds. If it does not hold then we add (y, {x, z}) to C.
Note that |C| ≤ |A|3 and C can be constructed in time O(|N |2 · |A|3 · |A|3).
Now that we have constructed the constraint set C, we can use an algorithm to
check whether NB can be satisfied by a linear order to test whether % is top
monotonic.
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4. Complexity of testing top monotonicity
It is not straightforward to use the connection with the problem of checking
satisfiability of NB constraints to show that testing top monotonicity is NP-
complete. We first show that if we consider partial orders instead of weak orders,
then testing top monotonicity can be proved to be NP-complete.
Top monotonicity as defined by Barbera` et al. [3] applies to preferences that
are weak orders. In this section, we first propose a plausible extension of top
monotonicity for partial orders.
Definition 3 (Top monotonicity of partial orders). A preference profile consist-
ing of partial orders satisfies top monotonicity if it possible to extend the partial
orders to weak orders in such a way so that the resulting profile of weak orders
satisfies top monotonicity.
We prove that testing top monotonicity of partial orders is NP-complete.
Theorem 2. Testing top monotonicity of partial orders is NP-complete.
Proof. We present a reduction from checking whether NB constraints can be
satisfied or not. For each NB constraint αi = (bi, {ai, ci}), we construct a voter
i1 who has the partial order
• ai ≻i1 ci ≻i1 bi
• ai ≻i1 x for all x ∈ A \ {ai}.
We also construct a voter i2 who prefers ci over all other alternatives, and
voter i3 who prefers bi over all other alternatives. We will refer to the partial
order profile as %.
We claim that the set of NB constraints is satisfiable if and only if the
resulting preference profile is top monotonic. One direction is easy: If the
NB constraints are not satisfiable then the second condition of top monotonicity
cannot be satisfied for all the voters. Hence the preference profile is not top
monotonic.
Now assume that the NB constraints are satisfiable. Then there exists an
ordering > over the alternatives A for which the NB constraints are satisfied.
We use > to extend % the partial order profile of the voters to single-peaked
total order profile %′. By Theorem 1 [3], we know that if a preference profile
is single-peaked, then it is top monotonic. Hence by showing that %′ is single-
peaked, we will show that % is top monotonic. For each voter i1, his preferences
are ai ≻i1 ci ≻i1 bi. We extend his preferences to a total order %
′
i1
as follows.
Firstly, we consider ai as the peak in the order >. We identify whether ci is left
or right of ai in >. Whichever direction ci is in, we start putting alternatives in
that direction in the preference list of %′i1 starting from alternatives nearest to ai
and then moving away. If there are alternatives on the other side of ai, then we
also append them to the preference list of %′i1 by first starting with alternatives
nearest to ai and then moving away. For each voter i2, we take ci as the peak in
%′i2 and then we put alternatives on one side with the alternatives nearest to ci
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put first and then we do the same with the alternatives on the other side of ci.
For each voter i3, we take bi as the peak in %
′
i2
and then we put alternatives on
one side with the alternatives nearest to bi put first and then we do the same
with the alternatives on the other side of bi. Now that we have constructed a
total order for all the voters, we argue that it is single-peaked. For each voter,
the peak is clearly defined. Moreover the preferences slope down from the peak
on either possible side according to the order >. Hence %′ is single-peaked.
We already know that single-peaked preferences are top monotonic [Theorem
1, 3]. Hence there exists a completion of partial order profile % that is top
monotonic.
Dichotomous preferences are one of the most natural restrictions on prefer-
ences in which voter places the alternatives in one of two equivalence classes [see
e.g., 7, 8, 10]. One may erroneously conclude that for dichotomous preferences,
testing the feasibility of first condition of top monotonicity is enough to test
top monotonicity. However, we show in the next example that whereas the first
condition of top monotonicity may be trivially feasible, the preference profile
may not be top monotonic.
Example 1. Consider the profile:
1 : {x}, {y, z}
2 : {y}, {x, z}
3 : {z}, {x, y}
The profile trivially satisfies the first condition of top monotonicity. Since
the profile is symmetric, consider any order >: x > y > z Note that for triple
{x, y, z} ∈ A(%). Furthermore, z %1 y, z /∈ t1({x, y, z}) ∪ t2({x, y, z}). Hence
the profile does not satisfy top monotonicity with respect to > and in fact any
order.
5. Conclusion
We initiated the study of testing top monotonicity of preference profiles.
Although we were unable to settle the complexity of the problem for weak
orders, we show that the problem reduces the checking whether a set of non-
betweenness constraints can be satisfied or not. We then show that testing
top monotonicity of partial orders is NP-complete. Finally, we highlight that a
simple profile with dichotomous preferences may fail to satisfy top monotonicity.
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